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Reservations About Extending Bivens to
Reservations: Seeking Monetary Relief
Against Tribal Law Enforcement Officers
for Constitutional Violations
Blake R. Bertagna*
In 1675 and 1676, New England colonial settlements were
ravaged by what one colonist penned a “dredffull bludy shouer”
of war.1  According to another colonist, the English settlements
had been transformed into a “burdensome and menstrous cloth”
to be cast aside.2  Another colonist lamented that “[n]othing
could be expected but an utter Desolation.”3  June 1675 marked
the beginning of what historians have called “King Philip’s
War”—a brutal conflict between several American Indian peo-
ples and English colonists residing in the New England region.4
* J.D., Brigham Young University - J. Reuben Clark Law School, 2006.  Mem-
ber, State Bar of Maryland and District of Columbia.  The author is a law clerk to
the Honorable Milan D. Smith, Jr. on the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.  The ideas expressed herein represent the author’s viewpoints only
and do not reflect the opinions of any judge sitting on the Ninth Circuit.  The au-
thor thanks Ken Kuykendall for his comments.
1. JILL LEPORE, THE NAME OF WAR 73 (1998) (quoting colonist Philip Walker).
2. Id. (quoting colonist Edward Wharton).
3. Id. at 72 (quoting colonist Nathaniel Saltonstall).
4. Id. at XV.  Historians have disputed calling this war “King Philip’s War.”
Some have proposed calling the war a “Puritan Conquest,” a name that reflects the
colonists’ conduct and aggression that contributed to the conflict. Id.  Others have
suggested referring to the conflict as “Metacom’s Rebellion,” a name that accu-
rately reflects King Philip’s real name, Metacom. Id. One other camp has pro-
posed referring to the conflict as an Indian civil war because of the Native
American involvement on both sides of the conflict. Id.
585
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The war inflicted severe losses on both sides.  During King
Philip’s War, approximately six to eight hundred English died
in battle.5  Based upon the total colonial population at that
time, the colonists’ death rate was “nearly twice that of the Civil
War and more than seven times that of World War II.”6  Ameri-
can Indians fared far worse.  According to one account, the En-
glish killed nearly three thousand American Indians, which is
an astounding loss based upon a total population of twenty
thousand.7  Moreover, many Indians who survived the vicious
struggle had to flee from their homes, had their property taken
from them, or were sold into slavery.8
King Philip’s War is merely one example of how the diver-
gent cultures of American Indians and English colonists, and
ultimately Americans, have defined a perpetual power struggle
for sovereignty and identity on this land between warring peo-
ples.9  The relationship between the United States and its indig-
enous populations has endured for over three centuries, and
still the contest for sovereignty persists today.  The Federal
Government’s view of its relationship with, and responsibilities
to, this country’s indigenous people has shifted back and forth
like a seesaw between separatism and paternalism.
5. ERIC B. SCHULTZ & MICHAEL J. TOUGIAS, KING PHILIP’S WAR 4 (1999).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 5.
8. Id.
9. Although numerous factors, particularly the colonists’ ever-growing territo-
rial expansion, combined over a period of time to spark King Philip’s War, the
event that seems to have been the last straw for the Indians was a jurisdictional
dispute over which sovereign had the right to try and punish several Indians who
were accused of murdering another Indian. YASUHIDE KAWASHIMA, IGNITING KING
PHILIP’S WAR 35-50, 66-87 (2001).  An Indian named John Sassamon mysteriously
disappeared and was later discovered dead not long after he betrayed King Philip’s
trust by warning the Governor of Plymouth that Philip was preparing for an at-
tack on the English colonists. Id. at 85-89.  Three Indian suspects were identified.
Under the Indians’ legal system, a murder of an Indian by Indians was a matter
for the Indian legal system to resolve. Id. at 112-13.  Under the English legal sys-
tem, however, because the alleged crime occurred within the boundaries of the
Plymouth colony, the colonists’ courts were the appropriate forum for the murder
trial. Id.  In the end, the colonists tried the three Indians for murder, found them
guilty, and sentenced them to death. Id. at 119-26.  The murder trial symbolized
another encroachment by the English colonists onto the Indians’ culture and an-
other step toward complete domination by the English, which the Indians would
not sit back and allow.
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/1
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In 1970, President Richard M. Nixon announced that it was
time “to break decisively with the past” by entering into a new
era for “tribal self-determination.”10  President Nixon stated
this shift in federal policy would “strengthen the Indian’s sense
of self-autonomy without threatening his sense of commu-
nity.”11  The first piece of major legislation aimed at achieving
self-determination was the Indian Self-Determination and Edu-
cation Assistance Act of 1975 (“ISDEAA”).12  Congress enacted
the ISDEAA to “respond to the strong expression of the Indian
people for self-determination by assuring maximum Indian par-
ticipation in the direction of . . . Federal services to Indian com-
munities so as to render such services more responsive to the
needs and desires of those communities.”13  The ISDEAA au-
thorized the Federal Government to enter into contracts with
Indian tribes under which tribes would agree to supply feder-
ally funded services that the government would have otherwise
provided.14
One program that the ISDEAA enabled tribes to assume
was law enforcement in Indian country,15 which had tradition-
ally been performed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”).
Congress later enacted the Indian Law Enforcement Reform
Act of 1990 (“ILERA”) to clarify the law enforcement authority
that could be exercised by the BIA in Indian country and to au-
thorize the delegation of such authority to Indian tribes.16
Thus, under the ISDEAA and the ILERA, Indian tribes can em-
10. Richard M. Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs
(July 8, 1970), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?
pid=2573.
11. Id.
12. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 450-458bbb-2 (2006)).
13. 25 U.S.C. § 450a (2006).
14. Id. § 450f.  The author will use the term “Indian” in this Article to refer to
members of federally recognized tribes.
15. The author will use the term “Indian country” in this Article to refer to
territory over which an Indian tribe has a claim of sovereignty recognized by the
Federal Government. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (defining “Indian Country” as “all land
within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United
States government,” “all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the
United States,” and “all Indian allotments”).
16. Pub. L. No. 101-379, 104 Stat. 473 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 2801-09 (2006)).
3
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ploy their own tribal employees or officers who are authorized
to act in the same capacity as that of BIA employees or officers.
Inherently, the receipt of authority opens up the possibility
for an abuse of authority.  Since the Reconstruction Era follow-
ing the Civil War, federal legislation has been in place to pro-
tect private citizens from, and to grant them a right to
monetary relief for, the abuse of authority by those acting under
color of state law.17  A similar right of relief against those acting
under color of federal law did not arise, however, until the U.S.
Supreme Court decided to create one in 1971 with its decision in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics.18  In Bivens, the Court held that a private party could
recover money damages from a federal officer for violations of
the party’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.19
The right to monetary relief granted under Bivens has im-
portant implications for tribal law enforcement officers who are
operating under a contract or grant of authority from the Fed-
eral Government under the ISDEAA or the ILERA.  If the BIA
has authorized an Indian tribe’s law enforcement officers to
carry out functions that the BIA would otherwise be perform-
ing, and if the Federal Government awards federal funds to
that Indian tribe to carry out such functions, some might argue
that such tribal officers are de facto federal officers and subject
to liability under Bivens.  In fact, certain plaintiffs have at-
tempted to make such an argument.  Surprisingly, even though
Bivens was decided over thirty-five years ago, neither the courts
nor the academic literature have substantively explored the
availability of a Bivens remedy against a tribal officer for un-
constitutional conduct.
This Article will engage in such an analysis.  Part I briefly
summarizes the history and nature of statutory relief available
to private parties to seek damages against an officer acting
under color of state law and provides an overview of the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Bivens.  Part II reviews the ISDEAA
and those provisions that allow the Federal Government to
enter into contracts with Indian tribes to provide law enforce-
17. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
18. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
19. Id. at 389.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/1
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ment services.  Part III analyzes the language of the ISDEAA
and ILERA and argues that these statutes only allow the BIA to
authorize tribal officers to enforce federal law, but that tribal
officers already have inherent authority to enforce tribal law.
As a result, a tribal officer can be considered a federal officer for
purposes of Bivens only when he or she is acting under author-
ity granted by the Federal Government pursuant to these two
statutes, requiring that (1) the officer has express authority, ei-
ther in a self-determination contract, a special commission, or
some other express memorandum or agreement, to enforce fed-
eral law and that (2) the officer is in the process of enforcing
federal law when he or she engages in unconstitutional conduct.
Part IV discusses the Supreme Court’s limited extension of Biv-
ens to new contexts in the past and its current general reluc-
tance to extend Bivens.  Based upon Congress’s active presence
within the area of federal Indian policy and the Supreme
Court’s cautious posture on Bivens, Part IV argues that despite
the possibility of treating a tribal officer as a federal officer in
the limited circumstances described above, Bivens should not be
extended to this new context.  Part V offers a brief conclusion.
I. A Right to Damages for Violations of Constitutional
Rights Under Color of Law
As the “[f]ather of the Constitution”20 and the “principal au-
thor of the Bill of Rights,”21 James Madison understood all too
well the precarious predicament presented by the symbiotic re-
lationship between power and government.  Inscribed on the
walls of the Library of Congress’s Memorial Hall are words that
Madison delivered to the Virginia State Constitutional Conven-
tion in 1829: “The essence of government is power; and power,
lodged as it must be in human hands, will ever be liable to
abuse.”22  The Founders understood that in forming “a more
perfect Union,”23 they were relinquishing the “state of Nature,”
20. Steven G. Calabresi, Text v. Precedent in Constitutional Law, 31 HARV.
J.L. PUB. POL’Y 947, 949-50 (2008).
21. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992).
22. James Madison, Speech in the Virginia Constitutional Convention (Dec. 2,
1829), in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 824 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 2d. ed. 1999), availa-
ble at http://www.loc.gov/loc/walls/madison.html.
23. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
5
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described by John Locke, and entering into a social contract
that would require them to “remain unalterably a subject” to
the Union’s laws.24
Nonetheless, despite the agreement to form a government
to accomplish the public good, some of the Founders, namely the
Antifederalists, did not believe “that individuals should relin-
quish all their natural rights” because “[s]ome are of such a na-
ture that they cannot be surrendered.”25  To that end, Madison
offered the Bill of Rights as a protection of Americans’ “inaliena-
ble” rights from the abuse of governmental authority.26  Since
1791, Congress and the Supreme Court have created specific
rights of relief, allowing individuals to seek money damages
from those acting under color of state and federal law for violat-
ing those inalienable rights.
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
In the aftermath of the Civil War, “race relations in the
South became increasingly turbulent.”27  Racist assaults were
often driven by the Ku Klux Klan, which launched “a wave of
murders and assaults . . . against both blacks and Union sympa-
thizers.”28  Worst of all, state governments were not effectively
punishing Klan members or rendering justice to their victims:
“These acts of lawlessness went unpunished . . . because Klan
members and sympathizers controlled or influenced the admin-
istration of state criminal justice.”29  In 1871, President Ulysses
S. Grant urged Congress to enact “federal legislation to curb
this rising tide of violence,”30 and Congress responded rapidly
24. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (1689), reprinted in PO-
LITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE §§ 121, 131 (David Wooton ed., 1993). See also
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 288 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
25. Brutus, On the Lack of a Bill of Rights, in THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS No.
84, at 243 (Morton Borden ed., 1965).
26. See generally Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the Bill of Rights: A
Reluctant Paternity, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 301 (discussing Madison’s efforts to push
the Bill of Rights through to ratification despite his own misgivings about them).
27. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 425 (1973).
28. Id.
29. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 337 (1983).  The Civil Rights Act was “de-
signed primarily in response to the unwillingness or inability of the state govern-
ments to enforce their own laws against those violating the civil rights of others.”
Carter, 409 U.S. at 426.
30. Carter, 409 U.S. at 425-26.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/1
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by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (also called the Ku Klux
Klan Act of 1871).31  Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act “to
interpose the federal courts between the States and the people,
as guardians of the people’s federal rights.”32
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act, which was ultimately codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides a civil remedy for violations of
constitutional rights caused by any person acting under color of
state law.33  Section 1983 “does not reach purely private con-
duct” or “actions of the Federal Government and its officers.”34
Rather, to receive relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must first
show that he or she has been “deprived of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States.”35  Section 1983 does
not contain any substantive rights.36  A plaintiff must demon-
strate that “the alleged deprivation was committed under color
of state law.”37  To act under color of state law, the actor gener-
ally must exercise power “possessed by virtue of state law and
made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the
authority of state law.”38  Although § 1983 was invoked spar-
ingly until the middle of the twentieth century, it is frequently
31. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). See also Carter, 409 U.S. at
426.
32. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
34. Carter, 409 U.S. at 424-25.  A plaintiff can seek damages from a state offi-
cial who acted under the color of state law in his or her personal capacity only. See,
e.g., Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991) (“[S]tate officials, sued in their individ-
ual capacities, are ‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983.”).  The Eleventh Amend-
ment bars similar suits against state officials in their official capacity. See, e.g.,
Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that a suit
against a state official acting in her official capacity constitutes a suit against the
state and is therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment, even if brought pursu-
ant to § 1983).  Local governments and officials can also be the subject of a § 1983
action. See, e.g., Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978) (hold-
ing that local governments and local government officials sued in their individual
capacities are liable under § 1983 if “the action alleged to be unconstitutional im-
plements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision offi-
cially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers” or if the unconstitutional
act is governmental “custom”).  In certain circumstances, private persons can be
the subject of a § 1983 action, namely where they “willfully participate[ ] in joint
action with state officials to deprive others of constitutional rights.”  Taylor v. List,
880 F.2d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 1989).
35. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49 (1999).
36. Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1999).
37. Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 49-50.
38. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (citation omitted).
7
\\server05\productn\P\PLR\29-4\PLR401.txt unknown Seq: 8  2-NOV-09 12:29
592 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:585
used today as an effective shield against infringement of consti-
tutional rights under color of state law.39
B. Bivens
When Madison astutely observed that “power, lodged as it
must be in human hands, will ever be liable to abuse,”40 he
wisely did not limit the potential for abuse to any specific level
or branch of government.  The Federal Government is as sus-
ceptible to abusing its authority as state governments.  To that
end, federalism was a vital component of the governmental
structure created under the Constitution.  In fact, the Framers’
intention in creating a federalist system was to enable the
states to guard against the specter of federal tyranny.41
Madison contemplated that state governments and the Federal
Government would function together as “a double security . . . to
the rights of the people.”42
Although Congress created a civil remedy against abuse of
authority by those acting under color of state law early on, it
has yet to create a parallel remedy for those acting under color
of federal law.  Instead, the U.S. Supreme Court created such a
remedy in 1971 in Bivens.
39. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION, 487-89 (5th ed.
2007).
40. James Madison, Speech at the Virginia Constitutional Convention (Dec. 2,
1829), available at http://www.constitution.org/jm/18291202_vaconcon.txt.
41. Note, Defending Federalism: Realizing Publius’s Vision, 122 HARV. L. REV.
745, 746 (2008). See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 179 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“It may safely be received as an axiom in our political
system that the State governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford com-
plete security against invasions of the public liberty by the national authority.”).
42. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 291 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).  Madison wrote the following:
In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to
the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded
against by a division of the government into distinct and separate depart-
ments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the
people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the por-
tion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments.
Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different gov-
ernments will control each other, at the same time that each will be con-
trolled by itself.
Id.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/1
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1. Facts and Procedural History
On November 26, 1965, Webster Bivens and his family
awoke to the terror of six Federal Bureau of Narcotics agents
suddenly barging into their apartment.43  Federal agents, who
believed that Mr. Bivens was guilty of narcotics violations,
“manacled” Mr. Bivens in front of his wife and children,
threatened to arrest Mr. Bivens’s entire family, and searched
the home “from stem to stern.”44  The agents then escorted Mr.
Bivens to the federal courthouse, where they interrogated him,
booked him, and subjected him to a strip search.45  But shortly
thereafter, Mr. Bivens was released without charges.46
The six narcotics agents had never secured a warrant for
the searches and arrest and may not even have had probable
cause to carry them out.47  Mr. Bivens, alleging that he was hu-
miliated and emotionally injured by the agents’ actions, decided
that the agents should be held liable for unreasonable con-
duct.48  In July 1967, Webster Bivens filed a lawsuit in federal
court seeking damages in the amount of $15,000 from each of
the agents.49
Both the district court and the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals ruled against Mr. Bivens.50  Neither court’s conclusion
should have been surprising.  At the time, there was no statu-
tory authorization for a private cause of action for damages
against a federal officer for violating a private citizen’s constitu-
tional rights.  Furthermore, no court had previously determined
that the Fourth Amendment, or any other amendment con-
tained in the Bill of Rights, created an implicit private right of
action for damages against a federal officer.  In an earlier deci-
sion, parties had broached the issue, but the Supreme Court
chose not to address the question at that time.51
43. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 389 (1971).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 389-90.
49. Id. at 389 n.1.
50. Id. at 389.
51. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681 (1946).
9
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2. Supreme Court Opinion
Once Mr. Bivens’s case made its way to the Supreme Court,
the Court had an opportunity to revisit the issue it had skirted
in Bell twenty-five years earlier.  This time, the Court ad-
dressed the question head-on and held that a violation of a pri-
vate citizen’s Fourth Amendment right “to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures . . . by a federal agent acting under color
of his authority gives rise to a cause of action for damages con-
sequent upon his unconstitutional conduct.”52
Justice William Brennan, writing for the majority, au-
thored a pithy opinion recognizing the newly created remedy.
Justice Brennan focused most of the majority’s opinion on
stressing that Mr. Bivens’s cause of action arose from the viola-
tion of a right that was unequivocally and absolutely created by
the Fourth Amendment.53  The Government had taken the posi-
tion that Mr. Bivens had a remedy, but one that was available
under state law only.54  According to Justice Brennan, however,
prior Supreme Court precedent had treated the Fourth Amend-
ment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure as a
right independent of state law, a right whose violation could be
actionable in federal court regardless of the legitimacy of the
offending conduct under state law.55  Justice Brennan bolstered
this position by describing the potential for conflict and even
hostility between state and federal laws.56  The Court expressed
concern that traditional state torts best suited for suing a fed-
eral official who conducts an unreasonable search or seizure,
namely trespass and invasion of privacy, might fail to account
for unique interests embedded in the Fourth Amendment’s
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.57
Throughout his opinion, Justice Brennan highlighted the
unique power that a federal officer exercises when operating
under color of federal law.  Justice Brennan noted that a federal
52. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
53. Id. at 392.
54. Id. at 391-92.
55. Id. at 392-93 (citing Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927); Byars
v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927)).
56. Id. at 394-95.
57. Id.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/1
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agent who exercises his official authority stands in a much dif-
ferent position vis-a`-vis a private citizen than does the average
private citizen.58  A federal agent is endowed with a significant
degree of authority to act in the name of the government and
“that power, once granted, does not disappear like a magic gift
when it is wrongfully used.”59 As a result, “[a]n agent acting—
albeit unconstitutionally—in the name of the United States
possesses a far greater capacity for harm than an individual
trespasser exercising no authority other than his own.”60
For these reasons, the Court decided that an independent
federal right existed under federal law.61  Furthermore, Justice
Brennan reasoned that when a federal right is violated, federal
law needs to furnish an adequate remedy to redress that viola-
tion.  Justice Brennan noted that “where federally protected
rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the begin-
ning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to
grant the necessary relief.”62  Quoting Marbury v. Madison, Jus-
tice Brennan observed that “[t]he very essence of civil liberty
certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”63  Thus,
as important as recognition of a federal right was an adequate
remedy under federal law for its violation.
Justice Brennan recognized that there was no express or
specific authoritative ground upon which the Court could recog-
nize a right to legal damages for violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment right.64  Nonetheless, Justice Brennan created a ground
for such a remedy from some general observations.  First, he
noted that “[h]istorically, damages have been regarded as the
ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in lib-
erty.”65  Second, he observed that “it is well settled that where
legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides
58. Id. at 392.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
63. Id. at 397 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
64. Id. at 396 (“Of course, the Fourth Amendment does not in so many words
provide for its enforcement by an award of money damages for the consequences of
its violation.”).
65. Id. at 395-96.
11
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for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may
use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.”66
Third, Justice Brennan concluded that Mr. Bivens’s case “in-
volve[d] no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence
of affirmative action by Congress.”67  For these reasons, Justice
Brennan concluded that the Court had authority to create a pri-
vate right of relief for damages.68
In his concurrence, Justice John Marshall Harlan added
what might be seen as an additional factor that was a key to the
Court’s decision to recognize a remedy in the form of monetary
damages.  Justice Harlan highlighted his concern that if the
Court did not allow Mr. Bivens to seek such damages, Mr. Biv-
ens would be without an adequate remedy under federal law.69
Justice Harlan expressed his doubt that a plaintiff in Mr. Biv-
ens’s position would find adequate relief in an equitable rem-
edy, such as an injunction.70  As a result, according to Justice
Harlan, “it is apparent that some form of damages is the only
possible remedy for someone in Bivens’ alleged position.”71  Be-
cause of the obstacle that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
poses against seeking legal relief against the government itself,
Justice Harlan thought that a right to seek relief against the
official responsible for the injury might be the only adequate
remedy available to an injured individual such as Mr. Bivens.72
II. The Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act
The relationship between the Federal Government and In-
dian tribes residing within the United States’ borders is unique.
In 1831, Chief Justice John Marshall described this relation-
ship as “perhaps unlike that of any other two people[s] in exis-
tence” and as one “marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions
which exist nowhere else.”73  Chief Justice Marshall noted the
66. Id. at 396 (quoting Bell, 372 U.S. at 684) (internal ellipsis omitted).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 392-97.
69. Id. at 409-10 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“For people in Bivens’ shoes, it is
damages or nothing.”).
70. Id. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 409-10 (Harlan, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring).
73. Cherokee Nation v. George, 30 U.S. 1, 16 (1831).
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dichotomous character of the relationship: an Indian tribe is “a
distinct political society . . . capable of managing its own affairs
and governing itself,” yet the land upon which Indian tribes re-
side “compose[s] a part of” and falls “within the jurisdictional
limits” of the United States.74  Stressing the latter, however,
Chief Justice Marshall declined to recognize Indian tribes as
“foreign nations.”75  Rather, he concluded that tribes “may,
more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent
nations . . . in a state of pupilage,” which led the Chief Justice to
decide that “[t]heir relation to the United States resembles that
of a ward to his guardian.”76
A. Self-Determination and Law Enforcement
Regardless of the accuracy of Chief Justice Marshall’s char-
acterization of the federal-tribal relationship, this concept of the
relationship as being one of fiduciary obligations such as ward-
guardian (or perhaps trustee-beneficiary) has directed and de-
fined the modern history of U.S. Indian policy.77  The policy has
proceeded through various stages, details of which are outside
the scope of this Article, but the current stage began approxi-
mately in 1970 when President Richard M. Nixon announced
the beginning of “tribal self-determination.”78  The first piece of
major legislation aimed at achieving self-determination was the
ISDEAA.79  In enacting the ISDEAA, Congress acknowledged
that “the prolonged Federal domination of Indian service pro-
grams ha[d] served to retard rather than enhance the progress
of Indian people and their communities by depriving Indians of
the full opportunity to develop leadership skills crucial to the
realization of self-government.”80
74. Id. at 16-17.
75. Id. at 17.
76. Id.
77. See generally Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal
Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1975) (discussing the fidu-
ciary relationship between the Federal Government and Indian tribes).
78. Nixon, supra note 10. See also Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law
and Tribal Self-Determination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779, 809-31 (2006) (summarizing
history of federal Indian policy).
79. See Washburn, supra note 78, at 817 (citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-458bbb-2
(2006)).
80. 25 U.S.C. § 450(a)(1) (2006). See supra note 12 and accompanying text
(explaining how the ISDEAA codified Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203).
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To change this trend, the ISDEAA authorized the Secretary
of Health and Human Services and the Secretary of the Interior
to enter into contracts with Indian tribes to allow tribes to
“plan, conduct, and administer” certain federal programs that
would otherwise be under the direction of the offices of the De-
partments of Health and Human Services or the Interior.81
Such contracts are called “self-determination” or “638 con-
tracts,” the latter reference arising from the public law number,
Public Law 93-638, for the ISDEAA.82
Section 450f lists five categories of programs that the Secre-
tary of the Interior may contract out to Indian tribes.  One of
these categories is programs “which the Secretary is authorized
to administer for the benefit of Indians under the [Snyder] Act
of November 2, 1921 (42 Stat. 208) [25 U.S.C. § 13], and any Act
subsequent thereto.”83  Section 450f clarifies that such pro-
grams are “contractable” regardless of the organization level
within the Department of the Interior responsible for such pro-
grams.84  This latter provision is relevant because 25 U.S.C.
§ 13 clarifies that the BIA, a division of the Department of the
Interior, is the agency directly involved with programs provided
to Indian tribes.  Section 13 provides that “[t]he Bureau of In-
dian Affairs, under the supervision of the Secretary of the Inte-
rior, shall direct, supervise, and expend such moneys as
Congress may from time to time appropriate, for the benefit,
care, and assistance of the Indians throughout the United
States . . . [f]or the employment of inspectors, supervisors, su-
perintendents, clerks, field matrons, farmers, physicians, In-
dian police, Indian judges, and other employees.”85
Under § 13, the BIA is authorized to direct, supervise, and
spend money for the employment of “Indian police.”86  There-
fore, under § 450f, Indian tribes can assume responsibility for
direction and supervision of their own police force in Indian
country.87  Of course, there are procedures for securing self-de-
termination contracts.  Under the ISDEAA, an Indian tribe
81. 25 U.S.C. § 450(a)(1).
82. Demontiney v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 780, 786 n.3 (2002).
83. 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a)(1)(B).
84. Id. § 450f(a).
85. Id. § 13 (emphasis added).
86. Id.
87. See id. § 450f.
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must submit a proposal for a self-determination contract to the
Secretary, who then has ninety days to approve and award the
contract, or to deny the tribe’s request.88  If the Secretary denies
the proposal, the Secretary must articulate his or her specific
findings or legal authority as to why the proposal was unaccept-
able.89  Throughout the course of performing under the self-de-
termination contract, the Indian tribe must satisfy certain
requirements, such as recordkeeping90 and executing the con-
tract in a competent manner.91  In return for performing the
self-determination contract, the Indian tribe receives federal
funding for the administration of services under the contract.92
By allowing Indian tribes to direct, supervise, and administer
their own police force on their own lands, the Federal Govern-
ment seeks to “assist [ ] Indian tribes in the development of
strong and stable tribal governments, capable of administering
quality programs and developing the economies of their respec-
tive communities.”93
B. Policing Indian Country
Before enactment of the ISDEAA, Indian tribes had little or
no control over law enforcement upon their lands.  With the cre-
ation of the reservation system in the early 1800s, federal
troops essentially assumed complete control of law enforcement
and maintenance of order on Indian lands.94  Beginning in the
1860s, the Federal Government permitted American Indians to
participate in law enforcement on reservations, but the Federal
Government remained the controlling force behind tribal law
enforcement.95  During the first sixty years of the twentieth cen-
tury, Indian tribes provided “grudging” and limited support to
law enforcement on reservations.96  Then, in the 1960s and
88. Id. § 450f(a)(2).
89. Id.
90. Id. § 450c.
91. Id. § 450m.
92. Id. § 450j.
93. Id. § 450a(b).
94. STEWART WAKELING ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, POLICING ON AMERICAN
INDIAN RESERVATIONS 41 (2001), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
188095.pdf.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 42.
15
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1970s, lobbying efforts on the part of Indian tribes highlighted
the crime problem on Indian reservations, which led to the
BIA’s increased involvement with law enforcement on those res-
ervations.97  Although the BIA made efforts to reduce crime and
“professionalize” tribal police forces, tribes themselves exercised
little control over the structure and administration of their own
law enforcement.98  Finally, in 1975, Congress enacted the IS-
DEAA in an effort to shift responsibility for law enforcement on
reservations from the BIA to tribes themselves in the name of
self-determination.99  Since 1975, Indian tribes have increas-
ingly entered into 638 contracts with the BIA to assume control
over their own law enforcement.100
There are 562 Indian tribes currently residing within the
United States’ borders, whose lands cover almost fifty-three
million acres.101  Policing Indian country is a daunting task, and
one that is miserably understaffed.  A typical tribal police de-
partment has one to three police officers on patrol at any one
time to protect about ten thousand tribal members spread out
over approximately fifty thousand acres (equivalent to the State
of Delaware).102  According to a 2001 Department of Justice sur-
vey, “the ratio of police officers to residents in Indian country is
1.3 per thousand.”103  Many tribes do not even have their own
97. Id. at 42-43.  The high crime rates in Indian country are driven, in part, by
the Federal Government’s lack of interest and ability to properly tend to the crime
occurring in Indian country. See, e.g., Larry EchoHawk, Child Sexual Abuse in
Indian Country: Is the Guardian Keeping in Mind the Seventh Generation?, 5
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 83, 99-100 (2001) (“U.S. Attorneys often decline to
prosecute Major Crimes Act cases on the reservation because of a mixture of fac-
tual, legal, practical, or logistical problems.”); B.J. Jones, Welcoming Tribal Courts
into the Judiciary Fraternity: Emerging Issues in Tribal-State and Tribal-Federal
Court Relations, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 457, 513 (1998) (“Federal prosecutors,
busy with prosecuting a variety of more serious crimes, perhaps have been remiss
in devoting the necessary attention to the problems that arise when non-Indians
commit offenses in Indian country . . . .”); Sarah M. Patterson, Note & Comment,
Native American Juvenile Delinquents and the Tribal Courts: Who’s Failing Who?,
17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 801, 815-22 (2000) (discussing “crime epidemic” on
Indian reservations).
98. WAKELING, supra note 94, at 43.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 7.
101. Bureau of Indian Affairs, Quick Facts, http://www.doi.gov/bia/
quickfacts.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2009).
102. WAKELING, supra note 94, at 9.
103. Id. at 26.
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police force.104  The lack of an adequate police presence in In-
dian country is particularly troubling because of the high preva-
lence of crime on Indian reservations.  According to information
collected in 2000, 506.1 crimes occurred for every one hundred
thousand residents throughout the United States, but 656.5
crimes occurred for every one hundred thousand residents on
Indian reservations.105  Even more dramatic was the finding
that a resident of an Indian reservation was almost twice as
likely to be the victim of an aggravated assault as any other
resident throughout the United States.106
C. Contractual Arrangements for Policing Indian Country
For those tribes that have police forces, there are three
principal administrative arrangements.  The most common ex-
ists under a 638 contract.107  Under this arrangement, as de-
scribed above, the tribe administers its police force under a
contract with the BIA, which “establishes the department’s or-
ganization framework and performance standards and provides
basic funding for the police function.”108  In 1995, eighty-eight
tribal police departments operated pursuant to a 638 con-
tract.109  The next most common arrangement is for a tribal po-
lice department to be directly administered by the BIA.110  In
1995, sixty-four tribal police departments operated in this man-
ner.111  Under the third arrangement, a tribe can enter into a
self-governance arrangement, referred to as a “compact” rather
than “contract,” which exists pursuant to certain amendments
104. See id. at v (“More than 200 police departments operate in Indian Coun-
try, serving an even larger number of tribal communities.”).
105. MATTHEW J. HICKMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TRIBAL LAW ENFORCE-
MENT, 2000, at 3 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/
tle00.pdf.  To give context to the limited resources of law enforcement officials
available for Indian country, consider that “[i]n 2000, the BIA and tribal agencies
employed about 2,300 full-time officers and 1,160 support personnel.  Other fed-
eral agencies employed over 88,000 officers and 72,000 support personnel [and]
[s]tate/local agencies employed over 708,000 officers and 310,000 support person-
nel.”  Robert McCarthy, The Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Federal Trust Obli-
gation to American Indians, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 53 (2004).
106. HICKMAN, supra note 105, at 3.
107. WAKELING, supra note 94, at 7.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 8.
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to the ISDEAA.112  Under a self-governance compact, a tribe re-
ceives its funding as a block grant to go toward a host of federal
services, granting the tribe more control over how it funds and
administers its own law enforcement services.113  As of 1995,
twenty-two tribal police departments operated under a
compact.114
III. The Indian Law Enforcement Reform Act: Defining the
Scope of the BIA’s Authority Over Law Enforcement
in Indian Country
Even though the ISDEAA authorized the Secretary of the
Interior to transfer its responsibility for law enforcement in In-
dian country, and Indian tribes quickly began entering into self-
determination contracts, the legal basis for the Secretary of the
Interior’s and the BIA’s authority to exercise such jurisdiction
in the first place was ambiguous.  The BIA had been responsible
for law enforcement in Indian country for over a century, yet
the source and scope of its authority resided in a patchwork of
legislative sources.115  The Department of the Interior and the
BIA had operated under a me´lange of statutes, such as the Sny-
der Act116 and the Indian Liquor Laws,117 as well as various fed-
eral appropriation acts made for the purpose of “maintaining
law and order on Indian reservations,”118 but there was no sin-
gular, express statute giving the BIA authority to enforce the
112. Id. In 1994, Congress amended the ISDEAA to allow Indian tribes to
assume responsibility for all of the federal services on the reservation, rather than
simply taking over a specific program, such as law enforcement.  Indian Self-De-
termination Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-13, 108 Stat. 4250 (1994).
Under these self-governance compacts, the Indian tribe is awarded a block grant of
federal funds, which the Indian tribe then chooses how to allocate among the vari-
ous federal programs that the tribe administers under the compact.  Washburn,
supra note 78, at 819.  A self-governance compact extends a great deal of flexibility
and control to Indian tribes over the federal services provided on the reservation.
WAKELING, supra note 94, at 8.
113. WAKELING, supra note 94, at 8.
114. Id.
115. S. REP. No. 101-167, at 5 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 712, 713.
116. 25 U.S.C. § 13 (2006).
117. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1154-56, 3055.
118. See, e.g., First Deficiency Appropriation Act, 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-152, 58
Stat. 150, 182 (1944).
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law in Indian country or defining what it was authorized to do
in carrying out that function.119
In 1990, Congress passed the Indian Law Enforcement Re-
form Act (“ILERA”) to “provide[ ] comprehensive statutory au-
thority for the Bureau of Indian Affairs to provide law
enforcement services on Indian reservations and in Indian
country.”120  The ILERA created two subdivisions within the
BIA: (1) the Office of Law Enforcement Services (“OLES”) be-
came responsible for “carrying out the law enforcement func-
tions of the Secretary in Indian country” and implementing the
ILERA’s provisions;121 and (2) the Branch of Criminal Investi-
gations (“BCI”) became responsible for investigating and prose-
cuting offenses committed in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 (the
Federal Enclave Act) and 1153 (the Indian Major Crimes Act) in
Indian country.122  The ILERA expressly articulated what the
BIA could do in performing its law enforcement duties (e.g.,
carry firearms, execute warrants, make arrests, etc.).123  Addi-
tionally, the ILERA provided that the BIA could enter into
agreements or contracts with Indian tribes to assist the BIA in
fulfilling the law enforcement duties that it was authorized to
perform under the ILERA.124
A. The ILERA’s Statutory and Regulatory Language
The ILERA makes an unequivocal distinction between the
BIA’s authority to enforce federal law and the BIA’s lack of au-
thority to enforce Indian law.  Section 2802(c) states that the
BIA is responsible for “the enforcement of Federal law and, with
the consent of the Indian tribe, Indian law.”125  Section 2803 as-
serts that the Secretary of the Interior may authorize BIA of-
ficers to “execute or serve warrants, summonses, or other orders
relating to a crime committed in Indian country and issued
under the laws of” the United States, but the BIA must receive
authorization from the Indian tribe to authorize BIA officers to
119. S. REP. No. 101-167, at 5 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 712, 713.
120. Indian Law Enforcement Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 101-379, 104 Stat. 473
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2801-09, 42 U.S.C. § 2991a).
121. 25 U.S.C. § 2802(b).
122. Id. § 2802(d).
123. Id. § 2803.
124. Id. § 2804(a).
125. Id. § 2802(c) (emphasis added).
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do the same in relation to tribal laws.126  Section 2803 similarly
states that the Secretary of the Interior may authorize BIA of-
ficers to
make inquiries of any person, and administer to, or
take from, any person an oath, affirmation, or affida-
vit, concerning any matter relevant to the enforcement
or carrying out in Indian country of a law of either the
United States or an Indian tribe that has authorized
the employee to enforce or carry out tribal laws.127
Section 2804 recognizes the same distinction, stating that
the BIA may enter into such agreements “to aid in the enforce-
ment or carrying out in Indian country of a law of either the
United States or an Indian tribe that has authorized the Secre-
tary to enforce tribal laws.”128  Lastly, § 2806 states that the
ILERA “alter[s] neither the civil or criminal jurisdiction of . . .
Indian tribes . . . nor the law enforcement, investigative, or judi-
cial authority of any Indian tribe.”129  In sum, the plain lan-
guage of the ILERA makes it abundantly clear that the BIA’s
inherent jurisdiction for law enforcement in Indian country
reaches federal law only.  To assert similar jurisdiction over tri-
bal law, the BIA must receive the express consent of the tribe.
The regulations that the Secretary of the Interior has en-
acted in conjunction with the ILERA affirm this distinction.
The regulations state categorically that “BIA officers will en-
force tribal laws only with the permission of the tribe.”130  The
Secretary of the Interior has encouraged the BIA and con-
tracting tribes to enter into Memoranda of Agreement (“MOAs”)
and Memoranda of Understanding (“MOUs”) to describe law en-
forcement responsibilities of the BIA and the tribe as they re-
late to tribal law in Indian country.131
The Secretary of the Interior has declared that even though
the BIA may have an agreement or contract with an Indian
tribe, the mere existence of such an agreement or contract does
126. Id. § 2803(2).
127. Id. § 2803(5) (emphasis added).
128. Id. § 2804(a) (emphasis added).
129. Id. § 2806(d).
130. 25 C.F.R. § 12.22 (2009) (emphasis added).
131. Internal Law Enforcement Services Policies, 69 Fed. Reg. 6,321 (Bureau
of Indian Affairs Feb. 10, 2004).
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not give the Indian tribe’s law enforcement officers power to en-
force federal law or to make them federal officers (each a critical
point when evaluating the scope of Bivens).132  Until a tribal of-
ficer is specially commissioned by the BIA to enforce federal
law, the tribal officer is not a federal officer.133  The prescribed
method for commissioning tribal officers to execute federal law
is to execute Cross Deputation Agreements (“CDAs”) and issue
Special Law Enforcement Commissions (“SLECs”).134  Tribal of-
ficers can be eligible for a SLEC once they have met certain re-
quirements such as receiving a firearms certification and
maintaining a felony-free criminal record.135  These SLECs fill
“a critical void in law enforcement in Indian country.”136  The
Department of the Interior has acknowledged local and state
law enforcement’s lack of responsiveness to assist with certain
crimes, such as domestic violence, in Indian country.137  With-
out a special grant of authority from the BIA, “tribal law en-
forcement in many jurisdictions is limited to restraining these
perpetrators until a county, state, or federal officer arrives.”138
Thus, “SLECs support the sovereignty of tribes by allowing tri-
bal law enforcement officers to enforce Federal law, to investi-
gate Federal crimes, and to protect the rights of people in
Indian country, particularly against crimes perpetrated by non-
Indians against tribal members.”139  The Secretary of the Inte-
rior’s regulations and related memoranda illustrate how Indian
tribes must take affirmative steps to have tribal officers author-
ized to enforce federal law, but no regulations or memoranda
mention any need of power or approval from the BIA for tribes
to enforce their own tribal laws.  In fact, the regulations make
clear that the BIA has no authority to do so without tribal
consent.
132. 25 C.F.R. § 12.21.
133. Id.
134. Internal Law Enforcement Services Policies, 69 Fed. Reg. at 6,321.
135. Id. SLECs must be renewed every three years. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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B. The ISDEAA-ILERA Relationship
Although the ILERA and ISDEAA are separate statutes, as
a practical matter the ILERA was an essential supplement to
the ISDEAA for 638 contracts related to law enforcement.  The
ISDEAA implicitly endorsed the BIA’s authority to carry out
law enforcement services in Indian country and expressly sanc-
tioned delegation of those services to Indian tribes,140 but there
really was no clear statutory basis at that time for the BIA’s
authority.  Then came the ILERA, which laid out the BIA’s law
enforcement authority in Indian country and permitted transfer
of that authority to tribal officers, but the ILERA did not pro-
vide for any kind of funding for an Indian tribe’s law enforce-
ment program.  Thus, Indian tribes that want to assume control
over law enforcement on their reservations and receive federal
funding for their law enforcement programs must enter into a
self-determination contract or self-governance compact pursu-
ant to the ISDEAA.141  But tribal officers who are operating
under such a contract or compact are, to a certain extent, bound
by the ILERA and its regulations.142
The relationship between the ISDEAA and ILERA is evi-
dent from the ILERA’s language and accompanying regulations.
The ILERA states that
[a]fter consultation with the Attorney General of the
United States, the Secretary may prescribe under this
chapter regulations relating to the enforcement of
criminal laws of the United States and regulations re-
lating to the consideration of applications for contracts
awarded under the Indian Self-Determination Act to
perform the functions of the Branch of Criminal
Investigations.143
Thus, Congress built into the ILERA the necessary rela-
tionship between the ILERA and ISDEAA by providing that the
Secretary of the Interior could promulgate regulations under
the ILERA to control self-determination contracts awarded
under the ISDEAA.144  The ILERA not only provided an express
140. See generally 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-458bbb-2 (2006).
141. See generally 25 U.S.C. §§ 2801-09; 42 U.S.C. § 2991a.
142. See infra notes 143-55 and accompanying text.
143. 25 U.S.C. § 2805 (2006).
144. Id.
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authorization for what the BIA had already been doing in In-
dian country for over a century, but also for what Indian tribes
had been doing under self-determination contracts for the previ-
ous decade pursuant to the ISDEAA.145  Those legislators who
enacted the ILERA acknowledged that tribal law enforcement
officers had already been performing many of the BIA’s func-
tions in Indian country pursuant to self-determination con-
tracts.146  Congress understood that the Secretary of the
Interior would need to enact regulations in relation to these
ongoing practices under existing and future self-determination
contracts.  Congress enforced its position that the ILERA and
its regulations were to work in conjunction with the ISDEAA by
stating that nothing in the ILERA was to “prohibit or restrict
the right of a tribe to contract the investigative program under
the authority of Public Law 93-638.”147
The ILERA’s regulations state that an individual partici-
pating in a “tribal law enforcement program receiving Federal
funding” is obligated to follow “minimum standards” in the
ILERA’s regulations.148  The regulations assert that a tribal law
enforcement program receiving federal funding is “subject to a
periodic inspection or evaluation to provide technical assis-
tance, to ensure compliance with minimum Federal standards,
and to identify necessary changes or improvements to BIA poli-
cies.”149  Additionally, tribal law enforcement programs receiv-
ing federal funding must ensure that “all law enforcement
officers complete a thorough background investigation no less
stringent than required of a Federal officer performing the
same duties.”150  Therefore, regulations that the Secretary of
the Interior has enacted in connection with the ILERA refer to
tribal law enforcement programs receiving federal funding,
which could apply only to those self-determination contracts
and self-governance compacts for law enforcement programs
145. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
146. See, e.g., Hopland Band of Pomo Indians v. Norton, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1067,
1073 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (“[R]outine law enforcement and police operation in Indian
country” were already being carried out either directly or “under contract with the
tribe.” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-60, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1989))).
147. 28 U.S.C. § 2802(d)(4)(i).
148. 25 C.F.R. § 12.11 (2009).
149. Id. § 12.12.
150. Id. § 12.32.
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that have been executed under the ISDEAA.  The ILERA does
not set up a separate funding scheme for Indian tribes’ law en-
forcement programs.  As such, the ILERA not only establishes
the basis for the BIA’s authority to enforce federal law in Indian
country and authorizes the transfer of that authority to tribal
officers, but it also articulates guidelines for tribal officers who
are acting under self-determination contracts and self-govern-
ance compacts pursuant to the ISDEAA.151
Arguably, Congress drafted the language of the ISDEAA in
a sufficiently broad manner to bring the ILERA within its
scope.  Under the ISDEAA, the Secretary of the Interior could
contract out “programs . . . which the Secretary is authorized to
administer for the benefit of Indians under the Act of November
2, 1921 (42 Stat. 208), and any Act subsequent thereto.”152  Con-
gress clearly understood the Snyder Act to authorize the Secre-
tary of the Interior to administer law enforcement programs in
Indian country.  By the time Congress enacted the ILERA, the
BIA had already specially commissioned approximately nine
hundred Indian law enforcement officers.153  But the ILERA
also encompassed statutes that were enacted after the Snyder
Act.  Congress surely did not intend the language “and any Act
subsequent thereto” to include every piece of legislation that
Congress enacted after 1921, but likely intended this language
to reach statutes passed as amendments of, or complements to,
the Snyder Act.  Section 13 of the Snyder Act authorized the
151. In some ways, the ILERA merely established the legal grounds for what
was already being done under the ISDEAA in practice.  At the time that Congress
enacted the ILERA, of the 900 law enforcement officers employed in Indian coun-
try, 700 had been commissioned as BIA Special Deputy Officers.  S. REP. No. 101-
167, at 5 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 712, 713.  It may have been for
this very reason that Congress provided in the ILERA that the ILERA did “not
invalidate or diminish any law enforcement commission or other delegation of au-
thority issued under the authority of the Secretary before August 18, 1990.”  25
U.S.C. § 2806(c).  In Hopland Band of Pomo Indians v. Norton, the district court
quoted a declaration submitted by the chairman of the Chemehuevi Indian Tribe,
which maintains a reservation within the County of San Bernardino, California.
324 F. Supp. 2d at 1076 n.3.  The chairman stated that from 1976 to 2000, the
Chemehuevi Indian Tribe and the BIA operated under a 638 contract for wildlife
and law enforcement services on the Chemehuevi Indian Reservation. Id. Under
the contract, the BIA had issued SLECs to the Tribe’s officers, authorizing them to
enforce various federal laws on the Chemehuevi Indian Reservation. Id.
152. 25 U.S.C. § 450f(1)(B) (emphasis added).
153. S. REP. No. 101-167, at 5 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 712, 713.
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BIA to “direct, supervise, and expend. . . [Congressional appro-
priations] . . . for the benefit, care, and assistance of the Indians
throughout the United States for . . . [g]eneral support and civi-
lization . . . [and] the employment of . . . Indian police.”154  The
ILERA was aimed directly at clarifying and strengthening the
Secretary of the Interior’s responsibility “for providing, or for
assisting in the provision of, law enforcement services in Indian
country.”155
In conclusion, the statutory language of the ISDEAA and
ILERA and the related regulations demonstrate the partner-
ship between these two statutes.  To understand the law en-
forcement authority that can be exercised by an Indian tribe
operating under a self-determination contract or self-govern-
ance compact, the source of that authority, and the limits of
that authority, one must consult the ILERA and its
provisions.156
C. Exceptions
When read together, the ISDEAA and ILERA clarify that
when the BIA enters into a contract or compact with an Indian
tribe for law enforcement services, the BIA can authorize tribal
officers to enforce federal law, but the BIA must explicitly and
affirmatively do so.157  Unless the BIA and an Indian tribe dis-
cuss and agree that the BIA will assist with enforcing tribal
law, the BIA has no authority to do so.158  In short, when tribal
officers are merely enforcing tribal law, they are doing so under
the tribe’s inherent sovereignty, not under any power granted
by the BIA.
Congress was undoubtedly aware of the legal implications
for Indian tribes and their officers, as well as for the Federal
Government, by having tribal officers enforce federal law in In-
dian country.  To that end, Congress expressly provided for two
situations, and only two, in which a tribal officer could be con-
154. 25 U.S.C. § 13.
155. 25 U.S.C. § 2802(a).
156. In Hopland, the district court recognized the partnership of the ISDEAA
and the ILERA by holding that “those law enforcement services or programs estab-
lished by the ILERA come within contracts for law enforcement services or pro-
grams under the ISDEAA.”  324 F. Supp. 2d at 1074.
157. 25 U.S.C. § 450f.
158. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
25
\\server05\productn\P\PLR\29-4\PLR401.txt unknown Seq: 26  2-NOV-09 12:29
610 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:585
sidered a federal officer.  Congress declared that “a person who
is not otherwise a Federal employee” and who is “acting under
authority granted by the Secretary under” the ILERA is consid-
ered “an employee of the Department of the Interior only for”
two purposes: (1) “the provisions of law described in section
3374(c)(2) of Title 5”; and (2) “sections 111 and 1114 of Title
18.”159
1. Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”)
Local and state law enforcement officers who are cross-dep-
utized by the Federal Government enjoy certain immunities
that federal officers who are acting under color of federal law
enjoy.  Title 5, § 3374(c) identifies statutory provisions under
which state or local government employees assigned or on detail
to a federal agency are considered protected federal employees.
Section 3374(c)(2) states that “a State or local government em-
ployee on detail to a Federal agency . . . is deemed an employee
of the agency for the purpose of . . . the Federal Tort Claims
Act.”160  Around the same time that Congress enacted the
ILERA, it amended the ISDEAA to allow recovery under the
FTCA for certain claims arising out of the performance of self-
determination contracts.161  This amendment expanded the
Federal Government’s liability under the FTCA, permitting pe-
titioners to sue the Federal Government for actions that “an In-
dian tribe, tribal organization or Indian contractor” commits
“while acting within the scope of their employment in carrying
out” a self-determination contract.162  Thus, both the ILERA
and ISDEAA harmoniously provide that tribal officers acting in
accordance with those two statutes may qualify as federal of-
ficers for purposes of the FTCA.
159. 25 U.S.C. § 2804(f).
160. 5 U.S.C. § 3374(c)(2). See also Petty v. United States, No. 02-1605, 2003
WL 22718254, at *3 (6th Cir. Nov. 17, 2003) (cross-deputized local employees qual-
ify as federal employees for purposes of FTCA).
161. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 101-512, tit. III, § 314, 104 Stat. 1915, 1959-60 (1990), as
amended by Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-138, tit. III, § 308, 107 Stat. 1379, 1416 (1993) (codified at
25 U.S.C. § 450f notes).
162. Id.
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Under the FTCA, a plaintiff can sue the United States for
money damages
for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or
death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omis-
sion of any employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment, under cir-
cumstances where the United States, if a private per-
son, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with
the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.163
Congress enacted the FTCA for the purpose of waiving “the
Government’s immunity from actions for injuries to person and
property occasioned by the tortious conduct of its agents acting
within their scope of business.”164  The FTCA arose from “a feel-
ing that the Government should assume the obligation to pay
damages for the misfeasance of employees in carrying out its
work.”165
It is worth mentioning that the FTCA and Bivens consti-
tute “parallel, complementary causes of action.”166  They are dis-
tinct causes of action that are informed by distinct inquiries.
The analysis of one does not control the outcome of the other.
One of the key differences between the two is the identity of the
defendant.  Under the FTCA, the defendant is the United
States; the FTCA does not provide a cause of action against in-
dividual government employees.167  Under Bivens, the defen-
dant is the individual officer.168  In fact, the Supreme Court has
recognized that Bivens is a more effective constitutional remedy
than the FTCA.  The Court’s conclusion was based on four find-
ings: (1) Bivens provides a monetary remedy against individu-
als, not simply the government, which makes Bivens a better
163. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). See also Galvin v. Occupational Safety & Health
Admin., 860 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1988) (“It is beyond dispute that the United
States, and not the responsible agency or employee, is the proper party defendant
in a Federal Tort Claims Act suit.”).
164. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 27-28 (1953).
165. Id. at 24.
166. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20 (1980).
167. Harbury v. Hayden, 522 F.3d 413, 416 (D.C. Cir. 2008). See also 28
U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (“The remedy against the United States provided by [the
FTCA] . . . is exclusive . . . .”).
168. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).
27
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deterrent against unconstitutional conduct; (2) Bivens allows
for the recovery of punitive damages, which are statutorily pro-
hibited under the FTCA; (3) Bivens allows the petitioner to have
a jury trial, which is not an option in an FTCA lawsuit; and (4)
Bivens provides more consistent and uniform protection, as
FTCA actions exist only if the state in which the alleged miscon-
duct occurred would authorize a cause of action for that
misconduct.169
One other crucial distinction between Bivens and the FTCA
is the source of the substantive cause of action.  Under Bivens,
federal law is the source of the substantive cause of action.170
Under the FTCA, the law of the state where the alleged miscon-
duct occurred provides the substantive cause of action.171  A pe-
titioner’s claim for a government employee’s conduct that
violated her Fourth Amendment right, which may be a viable
claim under Bivens, cannot constitute a cognizable claim under
the FTCA.172  Thus, “[t]he FTCA does not create new causes of
action.”173  It merely “serves to convey jurisdiction when the al-
leged breach of duty is tortious under state law, or when the
Government has breached a duty under federal law that is anal-
ogous to a duty of care recognized by state law.”174  The FTCA
accomplishes this purpose by waiving the Federal Govern-
ment’s sovereign immunity, permitting it “to be held liable in
169. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 20-22.
170. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478 (1994) (“By defini-
tion, federal law, not state law, provides the source of liability for a claim alleging
the deprivation of a federal constitutional right.”).
171. Id.
172. See id. at 477-79 (holding that petitioner’s Fifth Amendment Due Process
claim was not cognizable under the FTCA). See also Russ v. United States, 62 F.3d
201, 204 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Meyer, 510 U.S. at 478) (“Because the ‘law of the
place’ refers to state law, and state law cannot provide liability for the violation of
a federal constitutional right, constitutional wrongs cannot be remedied through
the FTCA.”).  In Carlson v. Green, when the Supreme Court held that FTCA and
Bivens actions are “complementary” causes of action, it did not mean that they are
“integrated causes of action.”  Washington v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 183 F.3d
868, 873 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Carlson, 446 U.S. at 20-21).  “That is, Carlson v.
Green does not mean that a claimant can bring a constitutional tort cause of action
under the FTCA.  Rather, victims of purposeful wrongdoing on the part of federal
law enforcement officers can bring specified intentional tort claims under the
FTCA and constitutional tort claims under [Bivens].” Id. (citing Carlson, 446 U.S.
at 20-21).
173. Medina v. United States, 259 F.3d 220, 223 (4th Cir. 2001).
174. Id. (citation omitted).
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tort in the same respect as a private person would be liable
under the law of the place where the act occurred.”175
Nonetheless, there are exceptions to this waiver.  Title 28,
§ 2680(h) provides:
[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false im-
prisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse
of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or
interference with contract rights: Provided, That, with
regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law en-
forcement officers of the United States Government,
the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of
this title shall apply to any claim arising, on or after
the date of the enactment of this proviso, out of as-
sault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse
of process, or malicious prosecution. For the purpose of
this subsection, “investigative or law enforcement of-
ficer” means any officer of the United States who is
empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evi-
dence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal
law.176
Although the first part of § 2680(h) lists specific examples
that are exceptions to the waiver, “[t]he proviso in § 2680(h)
takes the claims it specifies out of the exceptions and makes the
general waiver applicable to them.”177  Thus, the § 2680(h) pro-
viso “is an exception to the exceptions to the waiver of sovereign
immunity,” and “[t]he net result is that the United States has
waived its sovereign immunity for the claims listed in the
§ 2680(h) proviso.”178
Accordingly, the United States can be sued for assault, bat-
tery, false arrest, and other enumerated torts only if such torts
are committed by an “investigative or law enforcement officer[ ]
of the United States Government.”179  Because the FTCA de-
fines an “investigative or law enforcement officer” as one who is
“empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to
make arrests for violations of Federal law,” one might assume
175. Id. Generally, the Federal Government enjoys sovereign immunity from
lawsuits seeking monetary damages. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 510 U.S. at 475.
176. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2006).
177. Nguyen v. United States, 545 F.3d 1282, 1289 (11th Cir. 2008).
178. Id.
179. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
29
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that a tribal officer who is operating under an agreement pursu-
ant to the ISDEAA or ILERA so qualifies.180  Section 2803 of the
ILERA dictates that the BIA is authorized to make arrests, exe-
cute warrants, and seize evidence to enforce federal law in In-
dian country.181  Section 2804 of the ILERA states that the BIA
can authorize tribal officers to assist with such law enforcement
responsibilities and perform the enumerated actions that the
BIA would ordinarily perform.182  The inference of liability for
tribal actors seems clear.
Federal courts, however, have decided otherwise.  In Dry v.
United States, tribal police officers arrested three individuals,
members of the Choctaw Nation, for disturbing the peace and
resisting arrest.183  The three later sued the United States
under the FTCA, alleging that the tribal officers committed sev-
eral intentional torts against the plaintiffs.184  The district court
dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against the Federal Govern-
ment.185  On appeal, the Tenth Circuit had to decide the ques-
tion of whether the tribal officers were federal “investigative or
law enforcement officers,” as that term is specifically defined in
§ 2680(h).186  The Tenth Circuit held that when the tribal of-
ficers arrested the plaintiffs, the officers did not act as federal
employees or agents, nor did they act under color of federal
law.187  Rather, the accused tribal officers were acting under au-
thority inherent in their tribe’s sovereignty.188  As a result, “the
tribal defendants acted as agents of the Tribe pursuant to their
inherent sovereign power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over
intratribal offenses.”189
In Trujillo v. United States three tribal police officers of the
Isleta Pueblo Tribe responded to a phone call from Erlinda Tru-
jillo, who claimed that her estranged husband Robert Trujillo,
Sr. was drunk and should not have custody of their children.190
180. Id.
181. 25 U.S.C. § 2803.
182. Id. § 2804.
183. 235 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir. 2000).
184. Id. at 1252.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1257.
187. Id. at 1254-55, 1258.
188. Id. at 1258.
189. Id. at 1255.
190. 313 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1148 (D.N.M. 2003).
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When tribal police officers found Mr. Trujillo, they took his two
children and tried to place him under arrest, but he resisted.191
Mr. Trujillo later filed a lawsuit under the FTCA, claiming that
the officers physically attacked and beat him.192
The Isleta Pueblo Tribe had a 638 contract with the BIA for
the tribe’s law enforcement program.193  Nonetheless, the dis-
trict court declined to accept the position that “the mere exis-
tence of a Public Law 93-638 contract between [the] BIA and a
tribe for the provision of law enforcement services automati-
cally confers federal law enforcement authority upon the of-
ficers in tribal police departments.”194  The district court opined
that a tribal officer cannot qualify as a federal investigative or
law enforcement officer if he or she does not have authority to
enforce federal law.195  Examining the tribe’s 638 contract, the
court concluded that the contract did not state that enforcement
of federal law was one of its objectives or that it allowed tribal
officers to enforce federal law.196  Rather, according to the BIA
policy, tribal officers needed to be authorized pursuant to a
SLEC to enforce federal law, which none of the three Isleta
Pueblo tribal officers had received.197  Lastly, when the three
tribal officers encountered Mr. Trujillo, they were enforcing tri-
bal law only.198  As a result, even though the tribal officers were
operating under a 638 contract, they were not federal investiga-
tive or law enforcement officers for purposes of the FTCA when
they arrested Mr. Trujillo.199
The Fifth Circuit has agreed with the Tenth Circuit.  In
Hebert v. United States, a tribal officer of the Chitimacha Tribe
responded to a domestic dispute between a non-Indian couple at
a casino located on tribal land.200  The officer ordered the boy-
friend to leave the premises, but he refused, and the officer en-
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1150.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1151.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1150-52. See also Vallo v. United States, 298 F. Supp. 2d 1231,
1237-38 (D.N.M. 2003) (holding that a tribal detention officer who did not have a
SLEC was not an “investigative or law enforcement officer” under the FTCA).
200. 438 F.3d 483, 484 (5th Cir. 2006).
31
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ded up arresting him.201  During the arrest, the boyfriend was
injured.202  In Hebert, the tribe had a deputation agreement
with the BIA pursuant to the ILERA.203  Under the agreement,
the tribal officer was cross-deputized and had a SLEC.204  The
boyfriend sued the United States pursuant to the FTCA.205
The Fifth Circuit distinguished the factual scenario in
Hebert from that of Dry, noting that in Dry the plaintiffs were
tribal members.206  As a result, the tribal officer in Hebert—by
arresting and injuring the non-Indian boyfriend—could not
claim to have been acting under the tribe’s inherent sovereignty
to resolve intratribal matters.207  Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit
held that the officer was not an investigative or law enforce-
ment officer for purposes of the FTCA.208
According to the Fifth Circuit, “the salient issue” was
whether the tribal officer had acted within the scope of federal
employment, and the court held that he had not.209  Specifically,
the court determined that at the time the tribal officer arrested
the plaintiff at the casino, he was not employed as a BIA law
enforcement officer or special agent, and he was not “acting in
accordance with any special commission to assist the Bureau of
Indian Affairs with providing law enforcement services.”210  “In
short, the record demonstrate[d] that no enforcement of federal
law occurred when [the plaintiff] was arrested.”211  Thus, ac-
cording to the Fifth Circuit, even if a tribal officer is cross-depu-
tized by the BIA and has a SLEC, that officer is not a federal
officer for purposes of the FTCA (and hence, the ILERA or IS-
DEAA) if he is not actually enforcing federal law when con-
ducting the disputed law enforcement activity.212
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 485.
206. Id. at 487.
207. Id. at 486-87.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See also Pais v. Sinclair, No. EP-06-CV-137, 2006 WL 3230035, at *3
(W.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2006) (applying Hebert and holding that tribal officers were not
federal law enforcement officers for purposes of the FTCA).
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The Eighth Circuit evidently agrees with the Fifth and
Tenth Circuits.  In Locke v. United States, the plaintiff claimed
that a tribal police officer had assaulted her during the course of
an arrest.213  The Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe operated its
police department under a 638 contract.214  The record demon-
strated that at the time of the arrest, the tribal police officer
had received no federal certifications and that he was author-
ized to enforce tribal law only.215  Although the 638 contract
stated that the Tribe was obligated to “[p]rovide enforcement of
all Federal, State, Tribal and local Government laws . . . in ac-
cordance with the Contractor’s area of jurisdiction” and al-
though the tribe’s officers would sometimes accompany federal
officers to enforce federal law, the district court determined that
the tribal officer was not a federal law enforcement officer at the
time of the arrest.216  As a result, the district court dismissed
the plaintiff’s FTCA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion,217 and the plaintiff appealed.  In an unpublished disposi-
tion, the Eighth Circuit affirmed.218
In Washakie v. United States, a district court within the
Ninth Circuit relied upon the decisions in Dry and Hebert to
reach the same conclusion.219  In doing so, the district court dis-
tilled a two-prong analysis for determining whether a tribal po-
lice officer is a federal law enforcement officer for purposes of
the FTCA.220   The plaintiff in Washakie filed an FTCA claim
against tribal officers, alleging that he was assaulted while in
prison.221  The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the tribal officers
213. 215 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1035 (D.S.D. 2002).
214. Id. at 1036.
215. Id. at 1038.
216. Id. at 1038-39. See also Johnson v. United States, No. CIV. 06-1023,
2007 WL 2688556, at *3 (D.S.D. Sept. 11, 2007) (tribal correctional officer who had
no authority to enforce federal law was not a federal law enforcement officer).
217. Locke, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 1036-45.
218. Locke v. United States, No. 02-3152, 2003 WL 21212167 (8th Cir. May
27, 2003). See also LaVallie v. United States, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1083-87
(D.N.D. 2005) (a tribal officer was not a federal law enforcement or investigative
officer under FTCA because the tribe’s 638 contract did not expressly authorize
tribal officers to enforce federal law and the tribal officer was enforcing tribal law
only at the time of the arrest).
219. No. CV-05-462, 2006 WL 2938854, at *4 (D. Idaho Oct. 13, 2006).
220. Id.
221. Id. at *1.
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were not federal law enforcement officers.222  The court deter-
mined that for a tribal officer to qualify as a federal law enforce-
ment officer, two requirements must be satisfied: (1) “a tribal
police officer must be certified as a federal law enforcement of-
ficer for that officer to come under § 2680(h);” and (2) “the tribal
officer must have acted under color of federal law at the time of
the alleged tort.”223  Because the tribal officers had not been cer-
tified or even satisfied the requirements for certification, the
district court held that they were not federal law enforcement
officers.224
2. Sections 111 and 1114
Title 18, § 111 proscribes forcible action against “any per-
son designated in [18 U.S.C. §] 1114 . . . while engaged in or on
account of the performance of official duties.”225  Section 1114 in
turn prohibits the killing or attempted killing of “any officer or
employee of the United States or of any agency in any branch of
the United States Government” or “any person assisting such
an officer or employee.”226  The ILERA states that a person who
is not otherwise a federal employee, but who is exercising au-
thority granted under the ILERA, is considered an employee of
the Department of the Interior when acting in that capacity for
purposes of 18 U.S.C. §§ 111 and 1114.227  Thus, an individual
who directs forcible action toward or attempts to murder a tri-
bal police officer who is exercising law enforcement authority
delegated to him or her under the ILERA may be held liable
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 111 and 1114 for assaulting or attempting to
kill a federal officer.
The Eighth Circuit has enjoyed considerable experience
with questions of status under 18 U.S.C. §§ 111 and 1114.  In
222. Id. at *4.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. 18 U.S.C. § 111 (2006).
226. Id. § 1114.  At one time, § 1114 enumerated a long list of specific law
enforcement officers who would qualify under § 1114. See, e.g., United States v.
Sapp, 272 F. Supp. 2d 897, 902 (N.D. Cal. 2003).  Over time, Congress amended
the list so many times that it became “cumbersome” and an ineffective protection
for federal officers. Id. at 903-04.  In 1996, Congress amended § 1114 by removing
the list of enumerated officials and replacing it with the current general language.
Id. at 904.
227. 25 U.S.C. § 2804(f)(1)(B).
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United States v. Young, the defendant had an altercation with a
Rosebud Sioux Tribe police officer, which resulted in a convic-
tion under § 111.228  The defendant argued on appeal that the
Government had not proven that the arresting officer was a fed-
eral officer for purposes of § 111, but the Eighth Circuit dis-
agreed.229  Because the tribe had a 638 contract with the BIA,
and because that contract authorized the tribe’s employees to
execute law enforcement services that would otherwise be per-
formed by BIA officers, the arresting officer was acting pursu-
ant to that authority and was a federal officer within the
meaning of § 111.230  The Eighth Circuit noted that the mere
existence of a 638 contract is insufficient to make one a federal
officer for purposes of § 111, but where such a contract ex-
pressly grants the tribe authority to perform law enforcement
functions ordinarily performed by the BIA pursuant to the
ILERA, such a contract is enough to qualify any tribal officer
acting thereunder as a federal officer for purposes of § 111.231
In United States v. Oakie, a tribal officer pursued the defen-
dant and his friends in a car chase.232  The defendant fired a
rifle at and injured the officer.233  The defendant was convicted
under federal law for assault with a dangerous weapon and use
of a firearm during a crime of violence, as well as for assaulting
a federal officer with a dangerous weapon in violation of
§ 111.234  Even though there was no 638 contract or ILERA
agreement in place, the Eighth Circuit held that the officer was
a federal officer or employee for purposes of § 111.235  That the
officer was employed by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe and
was designated as a “Deputy Special Officer” by the BIA, a posi-
tion which authorized such officers to investigate any violation
of federal law in Indian country, was considered dispositive.236
The Eighth Circuit evidently recognizes that tribal officers
qualify, without some of the typical strictures one sees in such
228. 85 F.3d 334, 335 (8th Cir. 1996).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. 12 F.3d 1436, 1439-41 (8th Cir. 1993).
233. Id. at 1439.
234. Id. at 1438-39.
235. Id. at 1440.
236. Id.
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instances, as federal officers for purposes of 18 U.S.C. §§ 111
and 1114.  Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit has erred in ignor-
ing a crucial limitation in the ILERA’s provision for this excep-
tion.  To qualify as a federal officer for purposes of this
exception, the tribal officer must be “acting under authority
granted by the Secretary under” the ILERA.237  Another Eighth
Circuit decision illustrates this problem.  In United States v.
Schrader, two Oglala Sioux tribal officers received a report
about four individuals entering a home on the Pine Ridge In-
dian Reservation and assaulting its occupants.238  The officers
eventually caught up with the offenders and ended up in a
physical scuffle with all of them.239  All four defendants were
charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 111.240  The defendants tried
to get the charges dismissed at the district court level on the
ground that the two tribal officers were not federal officers per-
forming official duties for purposes of § 111; however, the dis-
trict court denied their request.241  The Eight Circuit affirmed,
holding that
[w]hen a 638 contract meets the definition of a
§ 2804(a) agreement, and when tribal officers desig-
nated under that contract enforce laws that BIA of-
ficers would otherwise enforce, § 2804(f) expressly
provides that those tribal officers are afforded the
same protection under 18 U.S.C. § 111 that Congress
has afforded BIA employees.242
The court added that a tribal officer acting under authority
granted pursuant to the ILERA qualifies as a federal officer “re-
gardless of whether the officer is enforcing a tribal, state, or fed-
eral law, so long as he is engaged in the performance of his
official duties rather than ‘a personal frolic of his own.’”243
Other Eighth Circuit decisions share this same mistaken
analysis.244
237. 25 U.S.C. § 2804(f) (2006).
238. 10 F.3d 1345, 1347-48 (8th Cir. 1993).
239. Id. at 1348.
240. Id. at 1347.
241. Id. at 1350.
242. Id.
243. Id. (quoting United States v. Heliczer, 373 F.2d 241, 245 (2d Cir. 1967)).
244. See, e.g., United States v. Roy, 408 F.3d 484, 491 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding
that tribal officer who initially pursued defendant for a tribal law matter, and who
36http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/1
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In short, the Eight Circuit ignores the textual requirement
that a tribal officer or employee be “acting under authority
granted by the Secretary” pursuant to an agreement authorized
under the ILERA.245  For reasons explained above, the ILERA,
ISDEAA, and their accompanying regulations unequivocally
prohibit the BIA from enforcing tribal law in Indian country un-
less consent is received from the tribe.  The Secretary of the In-
terior has expressly stated that the mere operation of tribal law
enforcement pursuant to a 638 contract or compact does not
make the tribe’s law enforcement officers federal officers.246
Rather, the BIA must commission tribal law enforcement of-
ficers, on a case-by-case basis, before they exercise federal au-
thority.247  But even if the required commission has been
executed, the commissioned tribal officer must still be “acting
under the authority granted by the Secretary” to come within
the § 111 exception.248  The ILERA does not state that the tribal
officer must be merely “possessing” such authority, but rather
that the officer must be “acting” under that authority.249  Most
importantly, the only authority that the Secretary can grant to
Indian tribes is the power to enforce federal law.  Indian tribes
already possess inherent authority to enforce tribal law in In-
dian country.  Tribal officers cannot be “acting” under authority
granted by the Secretary when the Secretary does not possess
such authority.  In sum, the Eighth Circuit’s position is unsup-
ported by the ILERA’s text and directly conflicts with the
Eighth Circuit’s analysis in the FTCA cases, where it has re-
was assaulted by defendant, qualified as a federal officer under § 111 because the
arresting officer was “undoubtedly performing a federal function—the provision of
law enforcement services on Indian land—at the time of the incident.”); United
States v. Bettelyoun, 16 F.3d 850, 852 (8th Cir. 1994) (upholding jury instruction
that stated “[t]ribal officers who are employed by a tribe under a contract with the
Bureau of Indian Affairs and who are specially commissioned deputy officers by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs are federal officers for the purposes of 18 U.S.C.
§ 111;” and holding that tribal officers were federal officers even though they were
enforcing tribal law only).
245. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2804(a), (f) (2006).
246. 25 C.F.R. § 12.21(b) (2009) (“Tribal law enforcement officers operating
under a BIA contract or compact are not automatically commissioned as Federal
officers; however, they may be commissioned on a case-by-case basis.”).
247. Id.
248. 25 U.S.C. § 2804(f).
249. Id.
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quired the tribal officer to actually be enforcing federal law to
qualify as a federal officer.250
3. Conclusion
Congress carved out two narrow niches where a tribal of-
ficer can assume the status of a federal officer.  First, a tribal
officer can be treated as a federal officer for purposes of 18
U.S.C. §§ 111 and 1114.251  Second, a tribal officer can be
treated as a federal officer for purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 3374(c)(2),
which, as a practical matter, means for purposes of the
FTCA.252  On this basis alone, one could argue that Congress’s
act of expressly delineating two precise scenarios in which a tri-
bal officer can qualify as a federal officer necessarily precludes
the treatment of a tribal officer as a federal officer for purposes
of a Bivens suit.  Congress was likely aware of Bivens liabil-
ity.253  Yet, even though Congress debated and provided for situ-
ations when a tribal officer could qualify as a federal officer,
including one scenario relating to tort liability, Congress did not
provide for federal status in Bivens suits.
Simply because Congress allows tribal officers to qualify as
federal officers in one context does not automatically mean that
tribal officers can qualify as federal officers in another context.
In Snyder v. Navajo Nation, law enforcement officers of the
tribe’s Division of Public Safety sued both the Indian tribe and
the United States, claiming violations of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act (“FLSA”).254  The Navajo Nation had a 638 contract
with the Federal Government.255  The plaintiff-officers argued
that because tribal officers can qualify as federal officers or em-
ployees in connection with the FTCA, this “means they are em-
ployees of the BIA for all purposes and can properly bring their
FLSA suit against the United States under 29 U.S.C.
250. See supra notes 213-18 and accompanying text.
251. 25 U.S.C. § 2804(f)(1)(B).
252. Id. § 2804(f)(1)(A).
253. See, e.g., Cal. Indus. Prods., Inc. v. United States., 436 F.3d 1341, 1354
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Congress is presumed to be aware of pertinent existing law.”);
United States v. Male Juvenile, 280 F.3d 1008, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In construing
statutes, we presume Congress legislated with awareness of relevant judicial
decisions.”).
254. 382 F.3d 892, 894 (9th Cir. 2004).
255. Id. at 897.
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§ 216(b).”256  The Ninth Circuit rejected this assertion and held
that the tribal officers could not bring a FLSA case against the
Federal Government.257  Similarly, the ability of a tribal officer
to qualify as a federal officer or employee for purposes of the
FTCA, or 18 U.S.C. §§ 111 and 1114, does not mean that a tri-
bal officer can qualify as a federal officer or employee for pur-
poses of a Bivens lawsuit.258
Nevertheless, the ILERA does not expressly indicate that
the two delineated exceptions are exclusive.  But even if a court
were to consider allowing tribal law enforcement officers to
qualify as federal officers for purposes beyond the ILERA’s two
exceptions, such a consideration is confined by two essential
guideposts.  First, the Federal Government must have specially
commissioned the tribal officer to enforce federal law.  The pri-
mary way of executing such a commission is a SLEC.259  Addi-
tionally, this threshold requirement may possibly be satisfied,
in certain circumstances, by language in the self-determination
contract, self-governance contract, cross-deputation agreement,
or memorandum of understanding that expressly authorizes the
tribal officers of the contracting tribe to enforce federal law.
Second, the tribal officer must be exercising his or her official
duties to enforce federal law.  If the tribal officer is enforcing
tribal law only, this second requirement cannot be satisfied.
Therefore, even if a court looks beyond the two articulated ex-
ceptions to qualify as a federal officer for purposes of a Bivens
suit, a tribal officer must have been commissioned to enforce
federal law and must have been enforcing federal law at the
time the plaintiff’s constitutional rights were purportedly
violated.
The ISDEAA and ILERA cannot be read or applied in isola-
tion.  The ISDEAA is the means by which Indian tribes can as-
sume significant control over law enforcement on their
reservations and receive federal funding for doing so.  To under-
stand the law enforcement authority that the Federal Govern-
ment is or is not delegating to an Indian tribe when entering
into a self-determination contract or self-governance compact,
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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however, one must refer to the ILERA and its regulations.  The
ILERA clarifies that tribal officers must be authorized by the
Federal Government to enforce federal law in Indian country
and explains the means by which such authorization can oc-
cur.260  Furthermore, the ILERA places clear limits on the Fed-
eral Government’s own law enforcement authority in Indian
country, namely that the Federal Government cannot enforce
tribal law without the tribe’s consent.261  Therefore, the ILERA
confines the federal status of tribal law enforcement officers to
two areas, and even if a court were to go beyond those two areas
and consider allowing federal status for purposes of Bivens, the
language of the ISDEAA and ILERA restricts a court’s discre-
tion. Bivens liability is properly extended only to tribal officers
who were commissioned to enforce federal law and who were in
the act of enforcing federal law when they engaged in alleged
unconstitutional conduct.
IV. Extension of Bivens
Even if a court stretches the federal status of a tribal officer
beyond the ILERA’s two narrow exceptions, and even if a court
finds that a tribal officer acted under color of federal law by be-
ing commissioned to enforce federal law and by enforcing fed-
eral law at the time the tribal officer violated a petitioner’s
constitutional rights, a court should decline to hold a tribal of-
ficer liable under Bivens.  The possibility for Bivens liability has
been around for almost forty years; however, as will be dis-
cussed below, the Supreme Court has only twice extended Biv-
ens to recognize a non-statutory remedy for damages.
Otherwise, “in most instances,” the Supreme Court has “found a
Bivens remedy unjustified.”262
A. Two Lonely Extensions
The first extension of Bivens took place in Davis v. Pass-
man, when the Supreme Court held that the implied cause of
action in Bivens could be extended to a violation of the Due Pro-
260. See supra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
262. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007).
40http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/1
\\server05\productn\P\PLR\29-4\PLR401.txt unknown Seq: 41  2-NOV-09 12:29
2009] RESERVATIONS ABOUT EXTENDING BIVENS 625
cess Clause of the Fifth Amendment.263  In Davis, a U.S. Con-
gressman had terminated the employment of his female
administrative assistant to replace her with a male.264  The
Congressman’s former employee sued him for sex discrimina-
tion and sought damages.265  The district court and Fifth Cir-
cuit, sitting en banc, ruled in the Congressman’s favor, holding
that there was no private right of action for damages for a viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.266
The Supreme Court reversed, determining that “[t]he equal
protection component of the Due Process Clause” creates “a fed-
eral constitutional right to be free from gender discrimina-
tion.”267  The Court also concluded that the petitioner had a
cause of action under the Due Process Clause because the judi-
ciary is “the primary means” by which federal constitutional
rights are enforced.268  Finally, the Court decided that damages
would be an appropriate remedy because there were “no special
factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative ac-
tion by Congress.”269  Key to this conclusion were the Court’s
findings that “[h]istorically, damages have been regarded as the
ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in lib-
erty”270; damages would be a “judicially manageable” remedy for
a lack of “difficult questions of valuation or causation”; and
there were “available no other alternative forms of judicial re-
lief” because the defendant was no longer a U.S.
Congressman.271
Only a year after Davis, the Supreme Court issued its sec-
ond and, to date, final extension of Bivens.  In Carlson v. Green,
the Supreme Court held that the implied cause of action in Biv-
ens could be extended to a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.272  In Carlson, the
plaintiff was the mother of a prison inmate who had allegedly
263. 442 U.S. 228, 230 (1979).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 231.
266. Id. at 232-33.
267. Id. at 235.
268. Id. at 241-42.
269. Id. at 245 (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978)).
270. Id. (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 402 U.S. 387, 395 (1971)).
271. Id.
272. 446 U.S. 14, 19-20 (1980).
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died from personal injuries suffered at the hands of federal
prison officials.273  The district court and Seventh Circuit ruled
in favor of the plaintiff, holding that she had sufficiently pled a
cause of action under the Eighth Amendment.274
The Supreme Court affirmed, relying on two findings.
First, the Court concluded that there were “no special factors
counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by
Congress.”275  The Court did not elaborate upon this Davis-like
conclusion other than to ambivalently assert that there was
nothing “to suggest that judicially created remedies against”
the federal prison guards were “inappropriate.”276  Second, the
Court determined that there was “no explicit congressional dec-
laration that persons injured by federal officers’ violations of
the Eighth Amendment may not recover money damages from
the agents but must be remitted to another remedy, equally ef-
fective in the view of Congress.”277  In other words, because Con-
gress had not explicitly precluded a damages remedy for such
constitutional violations, it was a viable remedy.
The Davis and Carlson decisions were driven by the lack of
an adequate remedy.  In Davis, the former administrative assis-
tant “lacked any other remedy for the alleged constitutional
deprivation” by the former U.S. Congressman, and in Carlson,
the deceased prisoner’s mother had only the FTCA under which
to seek relief from the federal prison guards (which was not an
equally effective remedy).278  So, as in Bivens, “it [was] damages
or nothing” for these plaintiffs.279
Nevertheless, since the Davis and Carlson decisions, the
Supreme Court has “consistently refused to extend Bivens lia-
bility to any new context or new category of defendants.”280  In
the last three decades, the Supreme Court has faithfully upheld
a position to respond “cautiously to suggestions that Bivens
273. Id. at 16.
274. Id. at 17-18.
275. Id. at 19.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 67-68 (2001) (discussing Da-
vis and Carlson).
279. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245 (1979) (quoting Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 402 U.S. 387, 410 (1971)).
280. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 68.
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remedies be extended into new contexts.”281  Justice Scalia has
even characterized Bivens as somewhat of a legal curiosity, “a
relic of the heady days in which this Court assumed common-
law powers to create causes of action—decreeing them to be ‘im-
plied’ by the mere existence of a statutory or constitutional pro-
hibition,” which days are apparently long gone.282  If Justice
Scalia had his way, he would limit Bivens, Davis, and Carlson
“to the precise circumstances that they involved.”283
B. Special Factors Counseling Hesitation
The Supreme Court’s decision in Wilkie v. Robbins is its
most recent approbation of its cautious Bivens policy.284 In Wil-
kie, the Supreme Court declined to extend Bivens to allow a pri-
vate landowner to recover damages from Federal Government
employees who had retaliated against the landowner for assert-
ing his property rights.285  To evaluate the plaintiff’s claim, the
Court articulated the following two-step test:
In the first place, there is the question whether any
alternative, existing process for protecting the interest
amounts to a convincing reason for the Judicial
Branch to refrain from providing a new and freestand-
ing remedy in damages.  But even in the absence of an
alternative, a Bivens remedy is a subject of judgment:
“the federal courts must make the kind of remedial de-
termination that is appropriate for a common-law tri-
bunal, paying particular heed, however, to any special
factors counselling hesitation before authorizing a new
kind of federal litigation.”286
The Court rested its decision at the second step of the anal-
ysis.  It concluded that there were “special factors counselling
hesitation” because an extension of Bivens to the landowner’s
type of retaliation claim would deluge the judiciary with “an on-
slaught of Bivens actions” and would burden courts with resolv-
281. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421 (1988). See also id. at 421-23
(collecting cases).
282. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring).
283. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
284. 551 U.S. 537 (2007).
285. Id. at 556-57, 562.
286. Id. at 550 (citation omitted) (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378
(1983)).
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ing claims under a vague standard that “would be endlessly
knotty to work out.”287  The Court finished by opining that a
damages remedy for such a claim “may come better, if at all,
through legislation” and echoing its prior declaration that
“ ‘Congress is in a far better position than a court to evaluate the
impact of a new species of litigation’ against those who act on
the public’s behalf.”288
The Supreme Court has consistently balked at extending
Bivens to areas in which Congress has actively injected itself.
The Court’s inquiry into the presence of such factors goes not to
“the merits of the particular remedy that [is being] sought,” but
to “the question of who should decide whether such a remedy
should be provided.”289  If Congress has evinced an obvious ef-
fort to treat a certain area of the law or a specific legal issue, the
Court has backed away and deferred to Congress in creating a
remedy.
In Bush v. Lucas, the Supreme Court declined to extend
Bivens to allow a federal employee to recover damages from his
superior for violation of his First Amendment rights.290  Be-
cause the issue was really one of “federal personnel policy,” and
because Congress had participated in an extensive history of
consideration and creation of remedies related to civil service in
the Federal Government, the Court decided that Congress was
“in a better position to decide whether or not the public interest
would be served by creating” a new remedy for violation of First
Amendment rights.291
Further, in Chappell v. Wallace, the Supreme Court re-
fused to extend Bivens to allow enlisted military personnel to
recover damages from their superiors for violations of their con-
stitutional rights.292  Because of “the peculiar and special rela-
tionship of the soldier to his superiors” and “the plenary
constitutional authority” that Congress had historically exer-
cised over the military, the Supreme Court found the extension
of Bivens to be inappropriate.293
287. Id. at 562.
288. Id. (quoting Bush, 462 U.S. at 389).
289. Bush, 462 U.S. at 380.
290. Id. at 368.
291. Id. at 390.
292. 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983).
293. Id. at 300, 302.
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Finally, in Schweiker v. Chilicky, the Supreme Court de-
clined to extend Bivens to allow applicants or recipients of So-
cial Security disability benefits to seek money damages from
government officials who administered the federal Social Secur-
ity program.294  The Court in Schweiker acknowledged that
Congress had failed to provide “complete relief” for individuals
in the plaintiffs’ position, noting that Congress had not provided
a damages remedy against government officials whose uncon-
stitutional conduct resulted in the wrongful denial of bene-
fits.295  Nonetheless, Congress’s efforts aimed at dealing with
the review of disability benefits had been “frequent and in-
tense.”296  The Supreme Court determined that Congress “is the
body charged with making the inevitable compromises required
in the design of a massive and complex welfare benefits pro-
gram” and was the governmental branch with the highest level
of competence at “balancing governmental efficiency and the
rights of individuals” in the social welfare context.297
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Bush, Chappell, and
Schweiker demonstrate the Court’s reluctance to extend Bivens
in an area of law with which Congress has established and af-
firmatively perpetuated a longstanding relationship.  The exis-
tence of this relationship in turn affirms an underlying common
sense or pragmatic judgment that Congress is the governmental
body best suited to formulate, tailor, and amend any remedies
that fall within that specific legal domain.  Matters of federal
personnel policy, national security and military, and welfare
benefits are clearly areas that have “received careful attention
from Congress.”298  In each area, Congress has made extensive
and comprehensive regulatory efforts.
C. Tribal Sovereignty Counseling Hesitation
The relationship between the Federal Government and
American Indian tribes is no different.  The Federal Govern-
ment’s involvement with Indian policy is as established and ex-
tensive as its involvement with any other sphere of law.  Since
294. 487 U.S. 412, 419-20 (1988).
295. Id. at 425.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 425, 429 (internal brackets omitted).
298. Id. at 423.
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the Federal Government entered into its first Indian treaty in
1778,299 the United States has made “frequent and intense”300
efforts to navigate its delicate relationship with Indian tribes,
which has resulted in a torturous history of separationist and
assimilationist polices.  Between 1789 and 1871, the Federal
Government entered into over 800 treaties with Indian tribes,
approximately 370 of which were ratified by the Senate.301  The
treaties tended to share certain essential elements: “a guaran-
tee that both sides would keep the peace, a marking of bounda-
ries between Indian and non-Indian land, a statement that the
signatory nations were placing themselves under the ‘protec-
tion’ of the U.S., and a definition of Indian fishing and hunting
rights (often applied to ceded land).”302
In 1871, Congress formally terminated the era of treaty-
making.303  Under the Indian Appropriations Act, pre-existing
treaties remained in force, but no new treaties could be exe-
cuted.304  Although the 1871 Act left existing treaties in place,
in 1903, in Lone Wolf v. Hithcock, the Supreme Court held that
Congress has plenary power to abrogate Indian treaties.305  The
Lone Wolf decision delivered a crushing blow to Indian sover-
eignty generally and set the stage for Congress to exercise ple-
nary power over Indian matters.  In Lone Wolf, the Supreme
Court concluded that “[p]lenary authority over the tribal rela-
tions of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the
beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political
one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of
the government.”306
Even before it formally ended treaty-making with Indian
tribes, Congress had already asserted a significant presence in
299. See Shira Kieval, Note, Discerning Discrimination in State Treatment of
American Indians Going Beyond Reservation Boundaries, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 94,
97 (2009).
300. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425-26 (1988).
301. See generally THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NATIVE AMERICAN LEGAL TRADITION
(Bruce Elliot Johansen ed., 1998).
302. Id. at 330-31.
303. Act of March 3, 1871, c. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566 (1871) (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2006)).
304. Comment, Federal Plenary Power in Indian Affairs After Weeks and
Sioux Nation, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 235, 244-45 (1982).
305. 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903).
306. Id. at 565.
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the area of criminal jurisdiction in Indian country.  In 1817,
Congress enacted the General Crimes Act (“GCA”),307 which
made federal criminal law in areas of exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion applicable to Indian country.308  The GCA included some
exceptions.  First, it did not reach crimes committed by one In-
dian against another.309  Second, the statute did not reach
crimes committed by an Indian that the tribe had previously
punished.310  Despite its exceptions, the GCA granted consider-
able power to the Federal Government to prosecute crimes com-
mitted in Indian country by and against non-Indians.311
In 1885, Congress enacted the Major Crimes Act (“MCA”),
which gave the Federal Government power to prosecute Indians
for specific major criminal offenses committed in Indian coun-
try.312  The MCA thus further extended the reach of the Federal
Government into relationships between Indians and tribal sov-
ereignty.  It “intruded into an area of exclusive tribal sover-
eignty and made federal law enforcement officers the primary
agents for adjudicating serious crimes on Indian reserva-
tions.”313  Although the MCA originally enumerated seven felo-
nies (murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill,
arson, burglary, and larceny),314 Congress has since expanded
the list to fifteen.315  Congress most recently amended the MCA
in 2006 to allow the Federal Government to prosecute “felony
child abuse or neglect.”316
307. General Crimes Act, ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383 (1817) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1152). See also Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the
Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 709, 716-17 (2006).
308. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006) (extending sole and exclusive jurisdiction for the
punishment of crimes committed in Indian country to the United States).
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Washburn, supra note 307, at 716-17.
312. Major Crimes Act of 1885, ch. 119, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153).
313. Washburn, supra note 307, at 717.
314. Washburn, supra note 78, at 804.
315. 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a).
316. Id. See also S. REP. No. 109-255, at 4 (2006) (mentioning that child abuse
or neglect in Indian country cannot be prosecuted under similar state law offenses
and that Indian tribes’ jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute acts of child abuse
and neglect is confined to acts committed by or against an Indian and having pen-
alties of no more than one year in custody and a $5,000 fine).  In United States v.
Kagama, the Supreme Court upheld the Major Crimes Act.  118 U.S. 375, 381-85
(1886).
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In 1953, Congress enacted Public Law 280, which granted
six states—Minnesota, Alaska, California, Nebraska, Wiscon-
sin, and Oregon—general criminal jurisdiction, as well as lim-
ited civil jurisdiction, over Indians in Indian country.317  Public
Law 280 established a framework to allow the other states to
eventually assume similar jurisdiction if they enacted requisite
affirmative legislation.318  A strong negative backlash to Public
Law 280’s omission of a tribal consent provision culminated in a
congressional amendment in 1968, requiring states to obtain
such consent before assuming jurisdiction.319  For the six
mandatory states and those states that have opted to assume
partial or total jurisdiction under Public Law 280, the statute
shifted responsibility for criminal and civil law enforcement in
Indian country from Indian tribes and the Federal Government
to state and local law enforcement agencies.320
In 1968, Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act
(“ICRA”).321  “As separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitu-
tion,” Indian tribes have been recognized to be unrestrained by
the “constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations
on federal or state authority.”322  This left tribal governments
responsible for crafting, applying, and protecting their own
members’ civil rights.  While perhaps well-intentioned, Con-
gress eventually came to learn of a concerning lack of protection
for Indians’ civil rights by their own tribes.323  Many tribes did
not have any type of constitution to protect Indians’ civil
rights.324  For those tribes who had constitutions, their protec-
317. Pub. L. No. 280, ch. 506, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1162 (2006) (mandatory states) and 25 U.S.C. § 1321 (2006) (optional states)).
318. See Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Law-
lessness in California Indian Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1406 (1997).
319. Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. IV, § 406, 82 Stat. 80 (1968) (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. § 1326). See also Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 318, at 1407.
320. Oliver Kim, When Things Fall Apart: Liabilities and Limitations of Com-
pacts between State and Tribal Governments, 26 HAMLINE L. REV. 48, 59-60 (2002).
The following nine states have chosen to opt in: Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Iowa,
Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Utah, and Washington. Id. at 60 n.72.
321. Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 201-701, 82 Stat. 73, 77-81 (1968) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (2006)).
322. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).
323. See infra notes 324-26 and accompanying text.
324. D.L. Burnett, Jr., An Historical Analysis of the 1968 “Indian Civil
Rights” Act, 9 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 557, 579 (1972) (background and legislative his-
tory of ICRA).
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tion of civil rights was incomplete.325  One significant area of
concern was due process, as many tribes did not provide a right
to a jury trial, a right to counsel, a right to remain silent, or any
right to appeal.326  Thus, Congress enacted the ICRA to impose
many of the limitations contained in the Bill of Rights upon tri-
bal governments.327  In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, the Su-
preme Court clarified that except for habeas corpus claims, the
ICRA could be enforced only through tribal forums.328
The ISDEAA originated in 1975, and then, in 1990, the
ILERA was created.  And yet, taken together, the GCA, MCA,
Public Law 280, ICRA, ISDEAA, and ILERA are a mere drop in
the bucket of the hundreds of statutes that Congress has en-
acted over the course of two hundred years to define and regu-
late the relationship between U.S. citizens and American
Indians.329  Like its involvement with federal employment, the
military, and social welfare, Congress’s involvement with In-
dian relations and policy generally is unequivocally an area
that has “received careful attention from Congress” and in
which Congress’s responsiveness has “been frequent and in-
tense.”330  Congress has been especially proactive in the areas of
criminal jurisdiction and civil rights in Indian country—areas
that align with policy considerations underlying Bivens.  Con-
gress’s consistent and affirmative presence in Indian policy un-
doubtedly constitutes a “special factor[ ] counselling hesitation”
for the extension of Bivens and a justification for “an appropri-
ate judicial deference to indications that congressional inaction
has not been inadvertent.”331
It is not a court’s job to decide whether it is good policy to
permit a party to sue a tribal officer for damages for a violation
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03.
328. 436 U.S. 49, 65-67 (1978).
329. See, e.g., Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat.
2467 (1988) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710-21 (2006)); Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978) (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-63 (2006)); Indian Health Care Improvement Act, Pub. L. No.
94-437, 90 Stat. 1400 (1976) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1601-83 (2006));
Indian Financing Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-262, 88 Stat. 77 (1974) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1544 (2006)).
330. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425-26 (1988).
331. Id. at 423.
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of constitutional rights.332  A court’s job is not to determine
whether Congress’s response has been sufficient.333  Rather, a
court’s inquiry in evaluating the “special factors counselling
hesitation” turns on the question “of who should decide whether
such a remedy should be provided.”334  Congress may not have
provided “complete relief” to individuals whose constitutional
rights are violated by tribal officers, but Congress has clearly
been active in the area and has a longstanding and special rela-
tionship with the Indian tribes residing in this country.335  Con-
gress is far more competent than the judiciary to balance the
policy concerns and implications of subjecting a tribal officer to
legal liability for executing actions that go to the heart of tribal
sovereignty.  In short, “Congress is in a far better position than
a court to evaluate the impact of a new species of litigation”
against tribal officers and employees.336
V. Conclusion
The sovereignty struggle between the United States Gov-
ernment and American Indian tribes has roots predating the
creation of this country and even King Philip’s War.  In 1970,
the Federal Government attempted to make “an historic step
forward in Indian policy” by rejecting its paternalistic policies of
the past and by building “upon the capacities and insights of the
Indian people” so that they could “control their own destiny.”337
The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act
and the Indian Law Enforcement Reform Act followed to shift
the tide toward self-determination and self-governance in the
area of law enforcement in Indian country.  By enacting these
two complementary statues, Congress handed the reins of law
enforcement to Indian tribes.  The statutory and regulatory lan-
guage of these two statutes makes clear that tribal law enforce-
ment officers can be authorized to enforce federal law and,
when doing so, they can qualify as federal officers in two narrow
circumstances.  But even in these two specific situations, a tri-
332. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 390 (1983).
333. Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 429.
334. Bush, 462 U.S. at 380.
335. Id. at 389.
336. Id.
337. Nixon, supra note 10.
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bal officer must be specially commissioned to enforce federal
law and must be in the act of doing so to qualify as a federal
officer.
Bivens is not one of these two narrow exceptions.  Nonethe-
less, even if a court were to endow a tribal law enforcement of-
ficer with the status of a federal officer for the purposes of
Bivens, the ISDEAA and the ILERA bind a court’s discretion to
situations where the tribal officer was expressly authorized to
enforce federal law and was in the act of enforcing federal law
at the time the officer violated another’s constitutional rights.
Even then, the Supreme Court has articulately announced and
faithfully upheld its cautious approach to the extension of Biv-
ens to new contexts.  Because of the highly visible, longstand-
ing, and proactive presence that Congress has established in
the area of Indian policy and law, a court has a “special factor[ ]
counselling hesitation” to the extension of Bivens to tribal law
enforcement officers.338  As a result, courts must defer to Con-
gress as the appropriate governmental arm for the creation of a
monetary remedy for the violation of constitutional rights by
tribal law enforcement officers and employees.
338. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 396 (1971).
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